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Abstract
In chapter one, I propose a model consolidating the norm- and preferences-based approaches
to explain laboratory bargaining outcomes. Social norms are identified by the axioms of
cooperative bargaining theory, and other-regarding preferences are captured using Fehr and
Schmidt’s inequity aversion utility function. The model applies to bargaining situations
where other-regarding agents abide by social norms in their decision-making. Preferences
and norms interact to determine bargaining outcomes, and their interaction undermines the
recoverability of the other-regarding preference parameters based on observations from the
lab.
In chapter two, I employ a lab experiment to study whether men receive lucrative tasks
more often than equally capable women so that a gender pay gap arises due to the difference
in the earnings potential. Subjects allocate a standard task and a lucrative task between two
workers, knowing their past performance, task preference, and sex. I find that men receive
the lucrative task more often than women, but past performance and a gender difference
in task preference account for the difference. Many workers shy away from the challenging
yet lucrative task, suggesting that a psychic cost may arise when the tasks are challenging.
Managers choose the efficient task allocation less often when the workers’ preferences go
against rather than with their money-incentive. The result suggests that managers show
concern for the subjective utilities of the workers.
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Chapter 1
Axiomatic bargaining with inequity
aversion: Norms vs. preferences
1.1 Introduction
Laboratory evidence on bargaining behavior has shown that subjects do not fit the standard
economic paradigm of selfish agents. Two distinct strands of literature emerged to better
organize laboratory bargaining outcomes, one theorizing other-regarding preferences and the
other social norms. The preference-based approach expands the utility function to reflect
both self-interest and fairness concerns. By assuming that at least some players are other-
regarding, the models of such as [17] and [12] are able to account for many stylized facts of
laboratory bargaining games. However, the preference-based models provide unsatisfactory
explanations for the frequent appearance of even splits and do poorly in explaining cross-
game variations unless preferences are context-dependent. Norm-based models arise in
response to these weaknesses. [6] formalize the norm of equal sharing and argue that people
like to be perceived as fair. [24] and [42] capture social norms in a non-cooperative game
with repeated interactions. [8] and [26] build a preference for adhering to norms directly
into the utility function, assuming that agents suffer disutility when they deviate from the
specified social norm.
So far the two approaches have stood apart. When other-regarding attitudes are explicitly
modeled, norm compliance is assumed away or held constant, and vice versa. By modeling
1
preferences and norms separately, we risk misinterpreting laboratory bargaining outcomes
if the two in fact interact in meaningful ways to determine bargaining behaviors. In this
paper, we model social norms and other-regarding preferences through separate channels in
one unifying framework. Social norms are identified by the axioms from the cooperative
bargaining theory, and other-regarding preferences are captured using Fehr and Schmidt’s
inequity aversion utility function.1 We discuss the connection between social preferences
and the bargaining power when a bargaining norm is present, and how the interaction of
preference and norm can undermine our ability to recover the other-regarding preference
parameters from laboratory observations.
We are the first to use axioms to describe social norms when other-regarding preferences
are present. We reinterpret the axioms coming from cooperative bargaining solutions as
identifying bargaining norms. The axioms governing the Nash solution ([30]) and those
governing the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution ([23]) identify two distinct social norms, which
differ only in their treatment of bargaining opportunities. The Nash norm makes untaken
opportunities irrelevant, while the Kalai-Smorodinsky norm allows the bargaining outcome
to respond to changes in the best opportunity of each individual.
Our model predicts even splits without having to hypothesize that a large fraction of
players would be willing to give away an extra dollar whenever they are ahead. In fact,
under the Nash norm, the bargaining outcome is an even split over a wide range of preference
parameters. In contrast, even splits are rare under the Kalai-Smorodinsky norm, and they
arise from aspects of the bargaining problem. The model also elucidates some challenges in
recovering preference parameters from laboratory bargaining data. When other-regarding
preferences and social norms interact to determine the bargaining outcome, researchers must
be careful when attributing the cause of an outcome change to one or the other. A more
equal division does occur when either agent becomes more inequity averse under the Nash
social norm. But under the Kalai-Smorodinsky norm, ceteris paribus, an agent who is more
averse to disadvantageous inequality may not demand a larger share. Agents’ preferences
may be unidentifiable if social norms also impact bargaining outcomes.
1[36] and [25] also incorporate “behavioral” elements into axiomatic bargaining theory. Both papers
examine loss-averse preferences, with Shalev using the Nash approach and Kobberling and Peters using the
Kalai-Smorodinsky axioms.
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The closest paper to ours is [3]. They conduct experiments to study how bargaining
outcomes respond to changes in the disagreement payoff and find that subjects respond
much less to changes in their own or opponents’ disagreement payoff than what the Nash
bargaining solution predicts. Exploring alternative explanations for the findings, they derived
results concerning how bargainers with Fehr-Schmidt preferences respond to changes in
disagreement payoffs under the Nash solution. While their paper shares with ours an
interest in combining axiomatic bargaining solutions with other-regarding preferences, their
experimental findings lend credence to the interest in this topic and make further study
worthwhile. We complement their paper by studying explicitly an additional axiomatic
bargaining solution and by asking new questions related to the preference parameters rather
than the disagreement payoffs. Their paper highlights the relevance of the approach, while
ours highlights some of the issues raised from pursuing it.
We review the bargaining axioms in Section 2 and presents the model in Section 3.
Section 4 discusses the results, and Section 5 offers some conclusions.
1.2 Axiomatic Bargaining Solutions and Social Norms
The cooperative game theoretic approach to bargaining involves specifying “nice” properties
that a solution should satisfy. These properties (axioms) are meant to describe a bargaining
outcome that a benevolent third party would recommend; therefore, they may embody
normative descriptions of fairness.2
The classic two-person bargaining problem consists of a compact convex subset S of the
plane representing all feasible utility payoffs achievable through bargaining and a point d ∈ S
representing the fallback payoffs to be received by the bargainers in case of a disagreement.
We only consider bargaining problems in which mutual benefits are possible; i.e. problems
for which there is some s ∈ S such that s > d.3 Let Ω denote the class of bargaining problems
2Axiomatic bargaining solutions have been interpreted as identifying social norms concerning fairness.
[28] characterizes the Nash solution using only the axiom of scale invariance and the Supple-Sen dominance
principle (or Supple-Sen Proofness), giving the first ethical interpretation of the Nash solution as representing
what constitutes a fair bargain. [4] incorporate the notion of distributive justice in axiomatic bargaining
solutions, though fairness considerations are captured by new axioms rather than by preferences.
3We use the following vector notation throughout the paper: s > d represents si > di ∀ i = {1, 2}.
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with disagreement point d and feasible set S, a bargaining problem in Ω is denoted by 〈d, S〉.
A solution f(d, S) is a function defined on Ω which associates with each bargaining problem
a single feasible outcome in S that satisfies some prespecified conditions (axioms).
We denote the Nash solution of the bargaining problem as fN(d, S) and the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution fKS(d, S). Both solutions satisfy four axioms and they have the
following three in common.4
Axiom 1. INV (Scale Invariance) λ(f(d, S)) = f(λ(d, S)) for λ > 0.
Axiom 2. SYM (Symmetry) If S is invariant under all exchanges of agents, fi(d, S) =
fj(d, S) for all i, j.
Axiom 3. PAR (Pareto Efficiency) f(d, S) ∈ {s ∈ S|@ s′ ∈ S with s′ ≥ s}.
INV suggests that the bargaining power of the bargainers should remain unchanged
when we scale the problem up or down. SYM means that identical bargainers should receive
identical outcomes. PAR claims that the outcome should achieve Pareto efficiency. The
Nash solution also satisfies the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), which
states that the unchosen possible bargaining outcomes are irrelevant, hence removing these
alternatives from the feasible set should not change the bargaining outcome.
Axiom 4. IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) If S ′ ⊆ S and f(d, S) ∈ S ′,
then f(d, S ′) = f(d, S).
Nash shows that axioms 1-4 hold if and only if the bargaining solution maximizes the
product of utility gains from the disagreement point:
fN(d, S) = arg max
(d1,d2)≤(s1,s2)∈S
(s1 − d1)(s2 − d2). (1.1)
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution was proposed in response to the controversy over the
IIA axiom. Kalai and Smorodinsky argue that the untaken alternatives represent bargaining
opportunities and should matter, especially the highest utility payoff available to each
bargainer. Let bi(S) ≡ max{si|s ∈ S} denote the maximal utility level attainable by agent i
4The formulation of all axioms is adopted from Thomson (1994, p. 1245-1249).
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among all allocations dominating the disagreement point. Kalai and Smorodinsky introduced
the following replacement for the IIA axiom:
Axiom 5. (MON) Axiom of Monotonicity If S ′ ⊆ S and bi(S ′) = bi(S), then
fj(d, S
′) ≤ fj(d, S).
MON states that if S allows agent j but not agent i to achieve a higher maximal utility
level than S ′ does, then the bargaining solution should award more to agent j from S than it
does from S ′. A sensible bargaining outcome should reflect the improvement of opportunities
for agent j. Define the bliss point of S as b(S) = (b1(S), b2(S)).
5 The Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution, fKS(d, S), is a unique solution that satisfies axiom 1-3 and 5. It is the maximal
point of S on the line L(d, b(S)) connecting d to b(S).
The two social norms, Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky, differ only in their treatment of
bargaining opportunities. When applying the Nash solution, the social norm is identified by
IIA, which rules out the impact of unchosen allocations on the bargaining outcome. When
applying the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, the social norm is identified by MON, which claims
that the bargaining outcome should reflect changes (deterioration or improvement) in the
bargaining opportunities of the bargainers.
1.3 Model
Laboratory bargaining games are phrased in monetary payoffs while axiomatic bargaining
problems are defined in utility payoffs. To model laboratory bargaining games as axiomatic
bargaining problems, we start with a bargaining problem defined in monetary payoffs, which
we refer to as a monetary bargaining problem, and transform it to a bargaining problem
defined in utility payoffs - one as defined in [30] and [23].
We are interested in a two-person bargaining situation where two agents, 1 and 2, bargain
over the division of some amount of money normalized to 1. An agreement divides the unit
into the allocation x = (x1, x2) ≥ 0 with x1 + x2 ≤ 1. If the two agents fail to reach
an agreement, they get their disagreement payoffs a = (a1, a2), a ∈ A, where A is the
5The bliss point b(S) may not be in set S.
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set of possible allocations defined in monetary payoffs. We call the pair 〈a,A〉 a monetary
bargaining problem, a term we use to distinguish the problem from the bargaining problem
defined in utility payoffs. To incorporate social preferences, we transform the monetary
bargaining problem into a bargaining problem defined in utility payoffs using the inequity
averse utility function in [17]:6
Ui(xi, xj) = xi − αi max{xj − xi, 0} − βi max{xi − xj, 0}, i 6= j, (1.2)
where 0 < βi < 1 and βi ≤ αi.
Let the disagreement point in utility space be d = (U1(a), U2(a)) and the bargaining
set S = {(U1(x), U2(x))|x ∈ A}. Then a ∈ A implies that d ∈ S, hence 〈d, S〉 is a
bargaining problem defined in utility payoffs. The class of all possible bargaining problems,
Ω, is obtained by transforming all possible monetary bargaining problems by inequity averse
utility functions. Therefore, all variations in Ω arise from changing either the disagreement
monetary payoffs or the parameters of the Fehr-Schmidt utility function.7 The bargaining
solution is a mapping f : Ω→ R2 such that f(d, S) ∈ S.
Using the Fehr-Schmidt utility function with positive αi means that there are monetary
allocations in A that player i likes less than the disagreement point. It would be individually
irrational to choose these alternatives. The set S¯ differs from S by excluding elements
that one or both of the players would reject. The following axiom guarantees that such
individually-irrational outcomes are not chosen by the bargaining solution.
Axiom 6. Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternative f(d, S) =
f(d, S¯) where S¯ ≡ {s ∈ S|s ≥ d}.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the transformation of the bargaining set from the payoff space
(the left panel) to the utility space (the right panel). The areas enclosed by the dark lines
6Like the bargaining solutions discussed below, the preferences also have an axiomatic foundation. [31]
axiomatizes a nonlinear generalization of the Fehr-Schmidt preferences in (1.2), and [35] provides axioms
foundation for the exact linear utility function form.
7We consider two effects of the parameter changes: one on the shape of feasible set and the other on
the location of disagreement point. Similar studies include [23] and [22], where they show how bargaining
solutions respond to changes in the feasible set. [39] discusses how bargaining solutions respond when the
disagreement point changes.
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Figure 1.1: Transformation of the Bargaining Set from A¯ to S¯
represent the set of payoffs from all feasible allocations of the unit between the two players.
The monetary payoffs are equitable at (0, 0) and (1
2
, 1
2
), thus the utility values of these
allocations are also (0, 0) and (1
2
, 1
2
). Comparing the monetary allocation (1, 0) to (0, 0),
player 1’s monetary payoff increases by 1 but her utility only increases by 1 − β1 because
she suffers from advantageous inequality, player 2’s monetary payoff remains unchanged but
his utility decreases by −α2 because he suffers from disadvantageous inequality. Therefore,
monetary allocation (1, 0) corresponds to (1− β1,−α2) in utility space. Similarly, monetary
allocation (0, 1) corresponds to (−α1, 1− β2) in utility space.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the bargaining problem to one with disagreement
monetary payoffs a = (a1, 0). The shaded bargaining set A¯ includes all monetary allocations
that are preferred to the disagreement monetary payoffs (a1, 0) by at least one player when
the players are inequity averse. The point d = (a1(1 − β1),−a1α2) is the utility value of
a, and the shaded bargaining set S¯ is the counterpart of A¯ in utility space.8 Allocations
in both A¯ and S¯ are individually rational for both players, while allocations in the white
regions make at least one player worse off than the disagreement point. Lemma 1.1 states
that the set S¯ is a valid bargaining set.
Lemma 1.1. The set S¯ is convex, compact, and has an element s ∈ S¯ for which s > d.
8We provide more details about the transformation in the Appendix B.
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Proof in Appendix.
1.4 Results
We solve the bargaining problem defined in utility payoffs following the Nash and Kalai-
Smorodinsky solutions and identify how the monetary payoffs, x1 and x2, change in the
preference parameters. We say that both agents are very averse to advantageous inequality
if βi ≥ 12 for i = 1, 2, and that both agents are moderately averse to advantageous inequality
if βi <
1
2
for i = 1, 2.
Proposition 1.2. If both agents are very averse to advantageous inequality, they split the
surplus evenly under either the Nash social norm or the Kalai-Smorodinsky social norm.
Proof in Appendix.
U2 U2
U1 U1d d′
S¯ S¯ ′
− 1−2β21+2α1
−1+2α21−2β1
(b) 1/2 < β1,2 < 1(a) 0 < β1,2 < 1/2
Figure 1.2: Preference Parameters Determine the Slopes of the Bargaining Frontiers
Proposition 1.2 agrees with [17] that even splits happen when agents are very averse
to advantageous inequality. The effect of other-regarding attitudes crowds out any impact
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that social norms may have on the bargaining outcome in this case. As shown in Figure
1.2, the slopes of the two segments of the bargaining frontier are functions of the preference
parameters.9 When βi >
1
2
for i = 1, 2, both segments of the bargaining frontier are upward
sloping, making point (1
2
, 1
2
) the only Pareto efficient allocation in the feasible set. As a result,
both the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky outcomes are purely driven by the axiom of Pareto
efficiency. Inequality attitudes do not provide bargaining power because the bargaining
opportunities do not matter other than the only Pareto efficient outcome. The asymmetry
of the disagreement point does not change the outcome for the same reason.
Different from [17], though, in our model the even splits can also arise in cases when
agents are moderately averse to advantageous inequality.
Proposition 1.3. When both agents are moderately averse to advantageous inequality, they
split the surplus evenly under the Nash social norm if a1 < a¯1 = (α2 +β1)/(α2(1−2β1)+(1+
2α2)(1− β1)), and they split the surplus evenly under the Kalai-Smorodinsky social norm if
(1− 2d1)/(b1 − d1) = (1− 2d2)/(b2 − d2) and d1 < 12 .
Proof in Appendix.
Proposition 1.3 suggests that strong aversion to advantageous inequality is no longer a
necessary condition for even splits to emerge. Even splits come into place through different
mechanisms under different social norms. The Nash solution to bargaining problem 〈0, S¯〉 is
an even split, and adding inequality attitudes only fixes the solution at that point. Figure
1.3(a) illustrates what happens. The dashed line is the bargaining frontier when neither
agents has other-regarding preferences, in which case the Nash solution is found at (1
2
, 1
2
).
Making agents averse to inequality rotates the two segments of the bargaining frontier inward
around the even split, further securing the solution at that point. As long as the disagreement
9To see this, first note that the northwest segment corresponds to the case when x2 > x1. The utilities
of the two players are U2 = x2 − β2(x2 − x1) and U1 = x1 − α1(x2 − x1). Also, x1 + x2 = 1. Solve the three
equations simultaneously and write U2 as a function of U1, we have that
U2 =
1 + α1 − β2
1 + 2α1
− 1− 2β2
1 + 2α1
U1.
The slope of the northwest segment is given by dU2dU1 = −
1−2β2
1+2α1
. Similarly, the slope of the southeast segment
is given by dU2dU1 = − 1+2α21−2β1 .
9
U2
U1U1
U2
U1 = U2 U1 = U2
fN = (12 ,
1
2) f
KS = (12 ,
1
2)
U1U2
0 0
b(S¯)
(a) (b)
Figure 1.3: Cases of Even Splits when β1,2 <
1
2
and a1 = 0
payoffs are equitable, even splits arise whenever the Nash social norm applies regardless of the
agents’ inequality attitudes. Under the Kalai-Smorodinsy social norm, however, even splits
are chosen only under the knife-edge condition that the line connecting the disagreement
point and the bliss point, L(d, S¯), happens to go through the even split. This requires that
(1− 2d1)/(b1− d1) = (1− 2d2)/(b2− d2) and that d1 < 12 . In the case of a zero disagreement
point, the condition reduces to (1 + 2α1)(1− 2β1) = (1 + 2α2)(1− 2β2).
Figure 1.4 shows the case when the (perceived) fallback position is unequitable (a1 > 0).
The bargainers split the surplus evenly under the Nash social norm unless the asymmetry is
severe enough (a1 is large enough). Figure 1.5 illustrates this tension. Each curve identifies
combinations of α2, β1, and a1 for which (i) the Nash bargaining solution shares the surplus
equally, and (ii) any decrease in α2, decrease in β1, or increase in a1 results in a movement
away from the even split.10 Fixing a1, then, any increase in α2 or β1 from a point on the
curve keeps the Nash outcome at (1
2
, 1
2
). When a1 = 0, the entire (α2, β1) space yields the
even split, which is consistent with the depiction of the symmetric case in Figure 1.3. As
a1 grows from zero the Nash outcome becomes asymmetric for sufficiently inequity-neutral
10The contours in Figure 1.5 are the loci of the a¯1 function defined in Proposition 1.3.
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b(S¯)
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(U1 − d1)(U2 − d2)
fN = (12 ,
1
2) f
KS = (12 ,
1
2)
(a) (b)
Figure 1.4: Cases of Even Splits when β1,2 <
1
2
and a1 > 0
agents, but only as a1 becomes large does a wide range of parameters support unequitable
bargaining outcomes.
Figure 1.4(b) depicts the condition that must hold for a symmetric outcome to emerge
from an asymmetric bargaining problem with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Changes in
inequity attitudes move both the disagreement point d and the bliss point b(S¯), making the
condition identified in Proposition 1.3 a knife-edge one. This differs from the Nash solution
where large parameter ranges yield an equal division despite asymmetry in the bargaining
problem.
Experimentalists have used bargaining games to identify other-regarding attitudes.
Figure 1.5 shows that for large regions of the parameter space, small changes in inequity
aversion have no impact on the Nash bargaining outcome because it remains at the equal
split. Once the outcome gets away from equal division, though, any change in the inequity
aversion parameters changes the Nash bargaining outcome. Any change in other-regarding
attitudes also moves the Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome. It becomes important to determine
the direction the bargaining outcome moves when the underlying preferences change, in part
11
Figure 1.5: Contours of a¯1
to explore whether inequity aversion strengthens bargaining power, and in part to determine
whether other-regarding attitudes really can be inferred from laboratory bargaining data.
Denote the share of the surplus of agent i(i = 1, 2) as xNi according to the Nash solution,
and xKSi according to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
Proposition 1.4. When both agents are moderately averse to advantageous inequality, under
the Nash social norm
∂xN1 /∂β2 = 0, ∂x
N
1 /∂α1 = 0, ∂x
N
1 /∂β1 < 0 and ∂x
N
1 /∂α2 < 0 when a1 > a¯1; under
the Kalai-Smorodinsky social norm ∂xKS1 /∂β2 ≥ 0, ∂xKS1 /∂α1 ≥ 0, ∂xKS1 /∂β1 < 0, and
∂xKS1 /∂α2 < 0 when a1 = 0, but its sign is ambiguous when a1 > 0.
Proof in Appendix.
Proposition 1.4 shows when inequality attitudes yield bargaining power. For the Nash
social norm, agent 1’s bargaining power increases when she becomes less averse to being
ahead or when agent 2 becomes less averse to being behind. These results match intuition
and are consistent with how experimentalists have interpreted the data. The results for the
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Kalai-Smorodinsky social norm are less clear-cut. A decrease in agent 1’s aversion to being
ahead still provides her with more bargaining power, but a decrease in agent 2’s aversion to
being behind may not.
U2 U2
U1 U1
d
b(S¯)
d
d′
b(S¯)b(S¯
′)
f ff
′
Figure 1.6: A Change in the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Outcome when α2 Increases
Figure 1.6 shows what happens. The left panel shows the Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome
before α2 changes. The right panel shows what happens when player 2 becomes more averse
to disadvantageous inequality (α2 increases). On one hand, player 2 dislikes the disagreement
payoff combination more after the change. This moves the disagreement point d downward to
d′. This change makes player 2 more agreeable, hence increases the bargaining power of player
1. On the other hand, when α2 increases player 2 suffers more disutility from allocations
that assign more than half to player 1. This rotates the segment of the bargaining frontier
below the 45-degree line clockwise around the even split. As a result, the new feasible set
excludes many allocations that favor player 1, making player 2 less agreeable and decreasing
the bargaining power of player 1. The change of the bargaining outcome depends on which
one of the two forces dominates the other. If the Kalai-Smorodinsky social norm governs
bargaining behavior, then, experimentalists can no longer infer the disadvantaged agents’
attitudes toward being behind from the outcomes of the game.
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1.5 Conclusion
This paper separates social norms from other-regarding preferences in bargaining situations
by using axiomatic, rather than non-cooperative, solutions. We present a framework
where inequality attitudes and social norms interact to determine bargaining outcomes.
We argue that their interaction changes how we rationalize laboratory data and poses
challenges to the inference of preference parameters using laboratory observations. Since
social norms and asymmetries in bargaining power both play important roles in decision-
making, experimentalists must take care when making sense of laboratory data. Different
procedural designs or framing may activate different social norms or introduce asymmetries
in bargaining power that are not immediately obvious, and both could affect bargaining
outcomes.
We realize that in taking the cooperative approach our model loses several useful features
of non-cooperative solution concepts, and also requires an unusual way of thinking about the
game. For example, strategic interactions and beliefs are absent in our framework. These
aspects of the bargaining games are especially relevant in the research on intentionality and
the theories of reciprocity, though they are not the concern of this paper. We also realize the
assumption that agents use axiomatic bargaining solutions requires that they know all of the
individual preference parameters, which runs counter to the non-cooperative approach and
is also questionable in bargaining situations where the interactions occur among strangers.
Despite these weaknesses, our framework still provides useful lessons as well as possibilities
for future research identifying axiomatic approaches to other social norms in the presence of
social preferences.
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Chapter 2
Gender-biased task assignment:
Evidence from a laboratory
experiment
2.1 Introduction
A rich literature has documented a converging yet persistent gender pay gap in the U.S.
labor market (e.g., [2]; [20]; [19]; [9]), especially at the top of the wage distribution. Among
many other explanations, labor economists have linked the gender earnings differential to
male-female differences in task characteristics and performance. In particular, surveys and
experimental studies have emphasized the contribution of a gender difference in preferences
towards risks, competition, negotiation, prosocial behaviors, and personality traits ([7];
[14]; [16]; [32]).1 The role of managerial decisions is less investigated and understood.
Several notable exceptions (e.g. [34] and [33]) revealed that managers are rarely gender-
blind. More recently, [21] studied the interaction between the gender difference in risk
attitudes and the performance-rewarding behavior of managerial roles. The participants
in their experiment rewarded the performance of male and female workers equally given
that the workers had chosen competitive remuneration (tournaments), but they rewarded
1[9] offers a summary of recent studies on these gender differences using survey data.
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the performance of females significantly less than that of males given that the workers had
chosen non-competitive remuneration (piece-rates). [11] found that managers show a gender
bias against women, but the bias was overcome by evaluating two workers jointly rather than
individually. These studies highlight the importance of the demand-side factors and their
interactions with the labor supply in explaining differential outcomes within a company.
Drawing insights from the management science, we consider performance multidimen-
sional and a function of the capacity, willingness and opportunity to perform.2 Gender-biased
task allocation creates gender inequality in on-the-job opportunities, which may subsequently
lead to performance and earnings gaps. We examine, in a laboratory experiment, whether
men receive lucrative tasks more often than equally capable women, leading to a gender
pay gap attributable to a gender difference in earnings potential. Observing a workplace
where the managerial roles are predominantly male, we hypothesize in-group favoritism the
main driver of managerial biases and design the experiment to differentiate it from other
possibilities.3
In the experiment, subjects earn money by both allocating to others and correctly
answering verbal analogy questions. Questions differ in the levels of difficulty and
profitability. As in [29], easy questions are taken from the past versions of the Scholastic
Aptitude Test (SAT) and hard ones from the past versions of the Graduate Record Exam
(GRE). Each correctly answered SAT question is worth 2 tokens. Each correctly answered
GRE question is worth 5 tokens. We choose these piece rates so that almost all our potential
subjects will find the GRE questions lucrative.4 Each subject plays the role of a manager and
allocates question types between two matched other subjects (the “workers”) in the same
2[10] argues that the missing opportunity is often the missing dimension of existing theories of individual
performance. They propose a model where three dimensions - the capacity, willingness and opportunity to
perform - interact to determine work performance.
3Studies in social sciences suggest several possible sources of gender biases in task allocation. Research in
social psychology and economics, for example, [40], [1] and [13], find strong evidence of ingroup favoritism
in reward or resource allocation. Management scientists find that women compared to men are more often
assigned to dull rather than challenging tasks (e.g. [15], [41], and [38]), though the manager’s gender mediates
the decisions ([27]). These studies conclude that the results are likely driven by managers’ stereotypical
beliefs, discrimination, or perceptions of the relative capability of men compared to women.
4[29] estimate the distributions of the success rates on the SAT and GRE questions of our potential
subjects - the undergraduate students at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville. We choose the piece
rates for our experiment based on the estimated distributions to make sure that the GRE questions, despite
challenging, are lucrative comparing to the SAT questions for almost all of our potential subjects.
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session. Managers allocate an SAT question to one worker and a GRE question to the other.
The money-maximizing strategy suggests an allocation based on the comparative advantages
of the workers. For simplicity, we call a worker “deserving” (of receiving the lucrative task) if
the worker has the comparative advantage in answering the GRE questions in a matched pair.
We examine how the sex composition of the three-person group (a manager and two workers)
cause deviations from the money-maximizing strategy. Deviations reduce social surplus and
harm the more capable worker to benefit the less capable. Managers suffer financially but to
a lesser extent than the harmed worker. These features depart from existing experiments on
discrimination, where discriminatory actions are often costless to the initiating parties and
harmless to social welfare (e.g. [18]; [5]).
We find that men receive the lucrative task more often than women, but the difference
can largely be explained by past performance and a gender difference in task preference. A
large fraction of workers shies away from the lucrative tasks, suggesting that the subjects
may incur a psychic cost when the tasks are challenging. The managers respond to the
task preferences of the workers. Hence the gender difference in task preference leads to a
gender difference in the earnings potential. Having a partner who wants the GRE question
lower the deserving worker’s chance of receiving the GRE question, especially when the
deserving worker is female. The managers who prefer the SAT to the GRE questions are
more susceptible to the influence of the task preferences of the workers than the managers
who prefer the GRE to the SAT questions. Our subjects allocate tasks efficiently most often
when workers’ preferences go with their monetary incentives and least often when workers’
preferences go against their monetary incentives. Moreover, the managers choose the efficient
task allocation less often when two workers both want the lucrative task than when two
workers both want the standard task. Our findings suggest that at least some managers
have concerns for the subjective utilities of their employees. These concerns are relieved if
the workers who were denied opportunity to work on their preferred tasks are compensated
financially and liberated if the workers happen to show interests in tasks accord to their
comparative advantages.
We present our experimental design and procedures in Section 2.2 and characterize the
rational choices of risk-neutral agents based on a simple Roy selection model in Section 2.3.
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Section 2.4 discusses our identification strategies and reports main findings. Section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
We wish to create a situation where a manager allocates two tasks of the same nature but
differ in profitability between two workers with similar past performance. The tasks employed
are verbal analogy questions taken from the past versions of the Scholastic Aptitude Test
(SAT) and the Graduate Record Exam (GRE). The GRE questions are more challenging
than the SAT questions by construct.5 We make the challenging tasks lucrative by choosing
a pair of piece rates such that most of our potential subjects would find the GRE questions
more profitable than the SAT questions given their success rates on each test.6
The experiment has three stages of play. Each subject plays the role of a manager in
stage two and the role of a worker in stage one and three. In stage one, each subject answers
ten SAT and ten GRE questions in 15 minutes. They learn about their success rates and
earnings on each exam, and then indicate which type of questions, the SAT or the GRE,
that they would prefer to answer in stage three (see Figure B4 in the appendix). In stage
two, each subject plays the role of a manager and allocates question types between two
matched workers for ten rounds. The managers assign task types to a new pair of workers
in each round. For each pair of workers, they allocate a GRE question to one worker and
an SAT question to the other, knowing each worker’s success rates, task preference, and sex.
We inform the managers about the sex of the workers by referring to a worker as a “he”
or “she” when describing their first stage performance and task preferences. The managers
do not know the specifics of the questions that they assign; they simply determine the type
of the questions (see Figure B5 in the appendix). In stage three, each subject receives 20
questions to answer in 15 minutes. A subject may receive fewer or more than ten SAT (or
GRE) questions, and the mix of question types solely depends on the decisions made by the
5The SAT is an undergraduate entrance exam while the GRE a graduate entrance exam.
6Different from [29], which set the piece rates for the GRE questions to be weakly higher than those
for the SAT questions, we set the piece rate for the GRE questions to be significantly higher than that of
the SAT questions so that the challenging GRE questions are money-maximizing for more than 90% of our
subjects.
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managers who received the subject’s information in stage two. In both stages one and two,
both types of questions are presented in the same format without labeling explicitly which
ones are drawn from the SAT and which are from the GRE (see Figure B3 in the appendix).
We adopt this feature of the design in hope to minimize possible effects that psychological
factors such as confidence or motivation may have on the performance of the subjects.
We conduct a short questionnaire before stage one to collect information on, among
other things, the sexes of the participants. A longer questionnaire after stage three asks the
participants about their thoughts on the experiment. The participants in all but the first
session of the experiment also select a gamble before the experiment starts.7 The gamble
selected by each subject was recorded during the first questionnaire. The outcome of the
gamble is determined by a computerized coin-flip by the end of the experiment for each
subject. The earnings from the gamble are reported to the subjects by the end of the second
questionnaire and added to their earnings from the experiment.
Each participant as a worker receives 2 tokens for every SAT question that they answer
correctly and 5 tokens for every GRE question that they answer correctly. Each participant
as a manager receives 2 tokens (5 tokens) if a worker to whom they assigned an SAT (a GRE)
question answers it correctly. The payment scheme makes sure that almost all subjects find
the GRE questions lucrative and that managers maximize their expected earnings choosing
a task allocation which aligns with the workers’ comparative advantages. Deviations from
this strategy are Pareto-damaging. They help the less capable worker at the costs of both
the manager and the more capable worker. Managers suffer financially but to a lesser extent
than the harmed worker. These features depart from existing experiments on discrimination,
where discriminatory actions are often costless to the initiating parties and harmless to social
welfare ([18]; [5]). The earnings in tokens were converted into dollars at a conversion rate of
five tokens to one dollar.
We ran six sessions of the experiment with a total of 106 subjects in the Experimental
Economics Laboratory at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville. To ensure a gender-
balanced sample, we scheduled two studies using the Online Recruitment System for
7The gamble selection was added to elicit the risk attitudes of the subjects when we noticed a gender
difference in task preference after the first session of the experiment.
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Economic Experiments (ORSEE) system to recruit male and female subjects separately
for any session of the experiment. We carried out a scheduled session as long as at least 16
subjects signed up.8
The subjects were seated in the waiting area outside of the computer lab upon their
arrival. Five minutes before the scheduled starting time of the experiment, we checked the
subjects in and in the order of their arrival time. Each of the subjects was given a card and
told to sit at the computer station corresponding to the letter printed on the card. The last
subject to arrive for a session where an odd number of subjects showed up did not participate
in the experiment and was given a $5 show-up fee.
Each participant had a copy of the information sheet and experiment instructions. The
participants in the last five sessions also received a copy of the game selection.9 The
instructions were read out loud, and the participants were asked if they have questions
about the experiments. Once the program was initiated, the experiment proceeded without
further communication between the experimenter and the participants. The participants
made decisions in private following the instructions shown on the computer screens until
the experiment concluded and the earnings reported. Subjects were paid with cash in an
envelope.
2.3 Conceptual Framework
The success rates of a subject in stage one should determine the subject’s money-maximizing
choice of the preferred exam for stage three. Let G denote the number of correctly answered
GRE questions and S the number of correctly answered SAT questions in stage one. A
risk-neutral individual is expected to prefer the GRE to the SAT questions if 5G > 2S and
the SAT to the GRE questions if 5G < 2S. Risk-neutral participants should be indifferent
between the two exams if 5G = 2S. Taking the log of both sides of the equation, we can
rewrite the condition for being indifferent between the two exams as
log(G) = log(
2
5
) + log(S). (2.1)
8The design and structure of the codes require an even number and a minimum of 12 participants.
9The handouts given to the participants are attached to this paper as part of the appendix.
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As shown in Figure 2.1(a), the graph of log(G) as a function of log(S) is a line with a y-
intercept log(2/5) and a slope of one. Under risk neutrality, money-maximizing individuals
should prefer answering the GRE questions if the locus of their (log(S), log(G)) fall above
the line defined by Equation (2.1), and they should prefer answering the SAT questions if
the locus of their (log(S), log(G)) fall below the line.
Figure 2.1: Money-Maximizing Sorting and Managerial Decisions Under Risk Neutrality
When risk-neutral managers (m) allocate an SAT question and a GRE question between
two workers (i and j), they maximize their expected earnings by assigning the GRE question
to worker i if 5Gi + 2Sj > 5Gj + 2Si and to worker j if 5Gi + 2Sj < 5Gj + 2Si. They should
assign the question types at random if 5Gi + 2Sj = 5Gj + 2Si, when the two alternatives
generate the same expected payoff. We can rewrite the condition for being indifferent between
the two allocations as
Si − Sj = 5
2
(Gi −Gj). (2.2)
Without the loss of generality, we label the worker with an absolute advantage (AA)
in answering the GRE in a matched pair as i so that Gi > Gj. Managers maximize their
expected earnings from task allocations by assigning the GRE to i and the SAT to j when
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(Si−Sj)/(Gi−Gj) < 5/2, that is, when the worker with an absolute advantage in answering
the GRE also has a comparative advantage (CA) in answering the GRE. Figure 2.1(b)
prescribes the money-maximizing choices of risk-neutral managers. For two matched workers
whose (Gi − Gj, Si − Sj) lies below the line of Si − Sj = 52(Gi − Gj), the managers should
assign the GRE to i, and for those whose (Gi −Gj, Si − Sj) lies above the line, they should
assign the GRE to j.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Task Performance and Preferences
We observe the success rates, task preferences, the numbers of GRE and SAT questions
received, and the earnings from answering and allocating questions for all 106 subjects. For
the 86 subjects of the last five sessions, we also observe their gamble choices and payoffs.
Table (2.1) summarizes the key variables of our subjects by their sex. We have an equal
number of female and male participants. In our sample, men perform better than women on
both the SAT and the GRE questions in stage one. On average, males answered 8.17 SAT
and 5.25 GRE questions correctly, while women answered 7.66 SAT and 4.91 GRE correctly.
Men on average also receive more GRE questions in stage three and earn slightly more than
women in all three stages of the experiment, but none of these gender mean differences are
statistically significant.
The majority of our subjects indeed find the GRE questions lucrative: all but nine
subjects earn more money on the GRE than on the SAT in stage one. We observe a positive
self-selection into task types, but the sorting based on performance is far from perfect. Figure
2.2 plots the log-transformed success rates of the participants by their stated task preference.
It shows that the participants who prefer the GRE indeed earn no less money from the GRE
than from the SAT in stage one, but many participants prefer the SAT even when the GRE
is financially rewarding for them. In fact, despite that more than 90% of all subjects earn
more money on the GRE than on the SAT in stage one, only half of them prefer to answer
the GRE in stage three.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics, Each Observation is a Participant
Female Male
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
S 53 7.66 1.73 4 10 53 8.17 1.98 0 10
G 53 4.91 1.58 1 8 53 5.25 1.52 1 10
GRE lucrative 53 0.91 0.30 0 1 53 0.92 0.27 0 1
Prefer GRE 53 0.40 0.49 0 1 53 0.62 0.50 0 1
No. SAT received 53 10.23 6.44 0 20 53 9.77 7.08 0 20
No. GRE received 53 9.77 6.44 0 20 53 10.23 7.08 0 20
Earnings ($)
Stage 1 53 7.97 1.98 3.8 12 53 8.51 1.97 3.4 14
Stage 2 53 8.30 1.53 4.8 11.2 53 8.40 1.85 2.6 12.2
Stage 3 53 8.18 2.88 2 17 53 8.51 3.44 1.2 16
Total 53 24.45 4.60 12 37 53 25.41 5.89 12.8 39.2
Gamble choice 41 3.24 1.30 1 6 45 4.18 1.47 1 6
Gamble payoff 41 5.33 3.25 0.8 12.4 45 5.54 4.43 -1.2 12.4
Note: Men perform better and earn more than women, but the differences are statistically insignificant. The gender differences
in task preferences and risk attitudes are statistically significant. A larger fraction of men than women prefer the GRE to the
SAT questions. The two sample test of proportions yields a z statistic with an absolute value of 2.33. Men are more risk averse
than women (|t| = 3.13), but the gender difference in risk attitudes does not explain the gender gap in task preferences.
Moreover, there is a statistically significant gender difference in task preference. An equal
percentage of women (91%) and men (92%) find the GRE questions lucrative, but a larger
percentage of men (62%) than women (40%) state to prefer answering the GRE questions
in stage three. Positive sorting based on past performance is more pronounced for male
than female participants. Figure 2.3 compares the sorting patterns of women and men. The
graph on the left shows that more high-ability women than high-ability men self-select into
answering the SAT questions, and the one on the right shows that more high-ability men
than high-ability women self-select into answering the GRE questions.
The gender difference in task preference has the potential to create a gender gap in
earnings because task preference has a sizable effect on the opportunity to earn, which
we measure using the number of GRE questions a participant receives in stage three. We
examine the determinants of the earnings potential and the actual earnings in stage three
with the following regression:
Y = α0 + α1 ·male+ α2 · askG+ α3 · S + α4 ·G+ , (2.3)
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Figure 2.2: Positive Sorting
* 54 subjects prefer the GRE, but log(S) is undefined for one subject
because he answers none of the first ten SAT question correctly.
where male is an indicator variable equal to one if the subject is male, askG is an indicator
variable equal to one if subject prefers to answer the GRE questions, S and G are the stage-
one success rates, and  is an idiosyncratic error. We run the regression using NumG, the
number of GRE questions received in stage three, and the actual earnings in stage three,
EarningSt3, as the dependent variable Y , respectively.
Table (2.2) shows that, conditional on stage-one success rates, the GRE-preferring
participants on average receive between one and two more GRE questions in stage three
than the SAT-preferring participants. Plus, their mean earnings is about $1.31 higher than
that of the SAT-preferring participants.
2.4.2 Task Allocations
Each subject as a manager allocates question types between two different matched workers
for ten rounds in stage two. Hence we observe the task allocation decision in 1060 unique
three-person groups. For each group, we can identify the efficient allocation because the
past success rates of all workers are observed. Figure 2.4 plots the relative performance
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Figure 2.3: Gender Difference in Sorting
* 33 male subjects prefer the GRE, but log(S) is undefined for one man
because he answers none of the first ten SAT question correctly.
(Gi − Gj, Si − Sj) of the matched workers, with i being the worker who has an absolute
advantage in answering the GRE. Figure 2.4 has several notable features due to aspects
of our experiment design. First, because the GRE is a harder exam than the SAT, two
matched workers differ more in their GRE success rates than in their SAT success rates.
Second, high-ability individuals tend to have high success rates on both exams because both
exams are aptitude tests. As a result, a worker with an absolute advantage in answering the
GRE often has a comparative advantage in answering the GRE as well. Lastly, a large share
of the observations locates at Si−Sj = 0 because we match the workers based on their SAT
success rates.
In 80 groups, two alternative task allocations yield identical expected payoff for the
manager (i.e. Si−Sj = 2.5(Gi−Gj)),10 in which case the managers choose either allocation
about half of the time (44%).11 The two matched workers in all remaining 980 groups have
comparative advantages in different question types, and the managers can maximize their
expected payoffs by allocating the GRE to the worker with a comparative advantage in
answering the GRE questions. An allocation based on comparative advantages is “efficient”
in the sense that it maximizes the total expected payoff of the three persons in a group.
For simplicity, we refer to the worker who has a comparative advantage in answering the
10In fact, the two matched workers in these groups have identical first stage-one performance. They are
the observations at point (0, 0) in Figure 2.4.
11The two-tailed test for the proportion equaling 0.5 has a p-value of 0.26.
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Table 2.2: Determinants of Earnings Potential and Earnings
Dependent Var: NumG NumG EarningSt3 EarningSt3
Coef. (std. error in parentheses)
male -0.54 -0.78 -0.54 -0.96
(0.91) (1.30) (0.38) (0.55)
askG 1.62 1.39 1.31** 0.92
(0.97) (1.31) (0.41) (0.55)
male ∗ askG 1.39 0.92
(1.31) (0.55)
S -0.99*** -1.00*** 0.23* 0.23*
(0.26) (0.26) (0.11) (0.11)
G 3.34*** 3.33*** 1.33*** 1.31***
(0.34) (0.34) (0.14) (0.14)
constant 0.36 0.50 -0.61 -0.36
(2.07) (2.15) (0.87) (0.90)
N 106 106 106 106
Adj R2 0.5472 0.5430 0.6338 0.6343
GRE the “deserving worker” and the other worker the “partner.” Table (2.3) summarizes the
characteristics of the deserving workers by their sex for all 980 groups in which a deserving
worker can be defined.
The average deserving worker has a lower success rate on the SAT and a higher success
rate on the GRE than the average participant. The GRE questions are lucrative for 96% of
deserving females, but only 50% of them wants to answer the GRE question in stage three.
All deserving males find the GRE lucrative, and 76% of them wants the GRE for stage three.
Despite the gender difference in their interests in the GRE, about the same percentage of
deserving men and women receive the GRE questions. Roughly 85% of deserving women
and 87% of deserving men receive the GRE. Because men on average perform better on the
SAT questions than do women in stage one, a larger fraction of deserving men than deserving
women have an absolute advantage in answering the SAT. About ten percentage of deserving
women have an absolute advantage in answering the SAT - compared to 16% of deserving
men. The majority of deserving workers (90% of women and 88% of men) has an absolute
advantage in answering the GRE.
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Figure 2.4: Relative Performance of Matched Workers
When two matched workers differ in their comparative advantages, our participants
allocate the tasks efficiently about 86% of the time, but the percentage of efficient allocations
varies across groups with different sex and preference compositions. We assign each
participant one of the four types based on their sex and task preference: females who prefer
GRE (FG), males who prefer GRE (MG), females who prefer SAT (FS), and males who
prefer SAT (MS). Table 2.4 summarizes the number of observations and the percentage of
efficient task allocations in each possible combination of the types of deserving workers and
their partners.
The most notable pattern shown by Table 2.4 is that task preference influences managerial
decisions. The percentages in the first two columns are on average lower than those in the
last two columns, which means that the deserving workers receive the GRE less often when
their partners want the GRE rather than the SAT. The managers choose efficient allocations
least frequently when the preferences of the workers go against their monetary incentives
and most frequently when the preferences go with their monetary incentives. When the
deserving worker wants the SAT questions while the partner wants the GRE questions,
the managers allocate tasks efficiently only 40-80% of the time. In comparison, when the
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics, Each Observation is a Three-Person Group
Female Deserving Worker Male Deserving Worker
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
S 490 7.61 1.83 4 10 490 7.73 2.29 0 10
G 490 5.73 1.38 2 8 490 6.04 1.43 4 10
GRE lucrative 490 0.96 0.20 0 1 490 1.00 0.00 0 1
Prefer GRE 490 0.50 0.50 0 1 490 0.76 0.43 0 1
Receive GRE 490 0.85 0.36 0 1 490 0.87 0.34 0 1
AA in SAT 490 0.10 0.30 0 1 490 0.16 0.37 0 1
AA in GRE 490 0.90 0.30 0 1 490 0.88 0.33 0 1
EP (A∗) 490 4.46 0.82 2.4 5.8 490 4.64 0.93 2.8 7
Note: The expected payoff from the efficient allocation, EP (A∗), is equal to 5Gi +2Sj if i is the deserving worker and 5Gj +2Si
if j is the deserving worker.
Table 2.4: Numbers of Observations and Percentages of Efficient Allocation, by Observation
Type
Deserving Worker
Partner
FG MG FS MS
FG 40 (78%) 60 (83%) 40 (100%) 90 (91%)
MG 70 (81%) 120 (94%) 100 (95%) 80 (90%)
FS 50 (64%) 50 (64%) 130 (93%) 30 (97%)
MS 10 (80%) 30 (40%) 40 (95%) 40 (80%)
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deserving worker prefers the GRE questions while the partner prefers the SAT questions, the
managers allocate tasks efficiently 90-100% of the time. When two workers prefer the same
exam, the managers allocate tasks efficiently more often when both workers prefer the SAT
to the GRE. On average, 84% of the allocations are efficient when workers both prefer the
GRE, while 91% are when workers both prefer the SAT. Our data suggest that the managers
may have concerns about the subjective utility of the workers. They are burdened and error
prone when their decision denies the workers of their desirable tasks, though part of the
burden seems to be relieved when the decision compensates the aggrieved worker financially.
Table 2.4 also suggests that the consequences of reporting the same task preference may
differ for men and women. When both workers want the GRE, having a male partner seems
to improve the chance of receiving the GRE for a deserving female, but having a female
partner seems to hurt the chance of receiving the GRE for a deserving male. When both
workers prefer the GRE, a deserving female receives the GRE 78% of the time when her
partner is another female and 83% of the time when her partner is a male. In contrast, a
deserving male receives the GRE 94% of the time when his partner is another male and 81%
of the time when his partner is a female. Moreover, stating to prefer the SAT seems to lower
the chance of receiving the GRE questions by a greater extent for women than it is for men.
The patterns we see in Table 2.4 could be driven by differences in performance because
success rates and task preferences are correlated. Now we turn to regression analyses to
examine them in detail. We begin by asking how having a partner who wants the GRE
affects the deserving worker’s chance of receiving the GRE. We run pooled OLS regression
getG = β0+β1 ·p askG+β2 ·p male+β3 ·p male askG+β4 ·EP (A∗)+β5 ·AAS+β6 ·AAG+β,
(2.4)
where getG is an indicator variable equal to one if the worker with a comparative advantage
in the GRE (i.e. the deserving worker) receives the GRE, p askG is an indicator variable
equal to one if the deserving worker’s the partner prefers the GRE, p male equals one if the
partner is male and zero if the partner is female, p male askG is the interaction of p male
and p askG, EP (A∗) is the expected social surplus generated by the efficient allocation and
captures the opportunity cost of allocating inefficiently, AAS is an indicator variable equal to
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one when the worker with comparative advantage in the GRE has an absolute advantage in
the SAT, while AAG is an indicator variable equal to one when the worker with comparative
advantage in the GRE also has an absolute advantage in the GRE.
We run regression (2.4) with the full sample and for different types of deserving workers
and managers. Table 2.5 reports the results from this set of regressions. Overall, having an
absolute advantage in answering the GRE significantly increase the probability of receiving
the GRE, while having an absolute advantage in answering the SAT significantly decrease the
probability of receiving the GRE. Once the information on absolute advantages is controlled
for, the opportunity cost of choosing the inefficient allocation has a marginally positive effect
on the probability of receiving the GRE.
Table 2.5: Probability of Receiving the GRE Question (Pooled OLS), by Deserving Worker
Type and Manager Type
Deserving Worker’s Type Manager’s Type
Variable All FG MG FS MS FG MG FS MS
p askG -0.19*** -0.22*** -0.13* -0.24*** -0.13 -0.06 -0.12* -0.20** -0.41**
(0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.14) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.14)
p male -0.04* -0.08* -0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.17
0.02 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09)
p male askG 0.09* 0.17* 0.13 0.02 -0.12 -0.06 0.01 0.15* 0.37*
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.18) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.16)
EP (A∗) 0.03* 0.00 0.03* -0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
AAS -0.11*** -0.18 -0.02 -0.04 -0.16 -0.11 0.02 -0.17** -0.20*
(0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.05) (0.12) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08)
AAG 0.49*** 0.42*** 0.38*** 0.52*** 0.64*** 0.33* 0.70*** 0.48*** 0.33*
(0.06) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.16) (0.13) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13)
Adj. R2 0.2623 0.1867 0.2417 0.3102 0.3675 0.1554 0.5087 0.2284 0.2016
N 980 230 370 260 120 196 302 300 182
Note: The full sample includes all three-person observations for which the deserving worker can be defined (i.e. two matched
workers had comparative advantages in different exams). Columns 2 - 5 report the regression results for each type of deserving
workers. Columns 6 - 9 report the regression results for each type of managers. (* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.)
The coefficients on p askG suggest that having a partner who wants the GRE significantly
decrease the deserving worker’s chance of receiving the GRE. The effect is stronger for
deserving females than for deserving males. Having a partner who wants the GRE lowers
the chance of receiving the GRE by 22-24% for a deserving woman but only by 13% for a
deserving man. Plus, the effect on deserving men is less statistically significant than that on
deserving women. Having a male partner decreases the chance of receiving the GRE for the
deserving worker unless the male partner wants the GRE, but these effects are statistically
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significant only for deserving women who prefer the GRE. Male managers are more responsive
to the preferences of the workers than female managers, and managers who prefer the SAT
are more responsive to the preferences of the workers than the managers who prefer the
GRE.
We then examine how the preference-composition of a three-person group affects the
allocation choices with the following regression:
getG = η0 + η1 · SS + η2 ·GG+ η3 · SG+ η4 · EP (A∗) + η5 · AAS + η6 · AAG+ η, (2.5)
where SS equals one when the two matched workers both prefer the SAT and zero otherwise,
GG equals one when the two matched workers both prefer the GRE and zero otherwise, and
SG equals one when the deserving worker prefers the SAT and the partner prefers the GRE
and zero otherwise. The groups in which the deserving worker prefers the GRE and the
partner prefers the SAT (GS) are the reference groups. Other regressors are as previously
defined. We run regression (2.5) with the full sample, and then for different sex compositions
of the two matched workers and types of managers. Table 2.6 reports the results from this
set of regressions.
All coefficients reported in Table 2.6 are either close to zero or negative: the managers
choose money-maximizing allocations less frequently as long as the workers’ preferences fail
to align with their monetary incentives. The percentage of efficient allocations is the highest
in groups GS - when the deserving worker prefers the GRE and the partner prefers the
SAT. Having two workers who both prefer the SAT does not lead to significantly more
managerial errors, but having two workers who both prefer the GRE does. The managers
choose the efficient allocation least frequently when the deserving worker prefers the SAT
and the partner prefers the GRE. Compared to the case where the asks go with money (GS),
the error rate of the managers is 19-37% higher when the asks go against money (SG).
The results from the regressions confirm most of our conclusions drawn from the patterns
observed in Table 2.4. Managers allocate 86% of the tasks efficiently and show mild gender-
based bias. Deserving women are more likely than deserving men to lose the lucrative task
to partners who want the lucrative tasks. Compared to gender, task preference plays a much
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Table 2.6: Probability of Receiving the GRE Question (Pooled OLS), by the Sex
Composition of Matched Workers and Manager Type
Workers’ Sex Composition Manager’s Type
Variable All FF FM MM MF FG MG FS MS
SS -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.09
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
GG -0.08** -0.23*** -0.06 0.01 -0.13* -0.06 0.08* -0.06 -0.11
0.03 (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09)
SG -0.28*** -0.30*** -0.23*** -0.37*** -0.19 -0.25** -0.21* -0.29*** -0.30*
(0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11)
EP (A∗) 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
AAS -0.09** -0.09* -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 0.03 -0.16* -0.15*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08)
AAG 0.48*** 0.45*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.31** 0.34* 0.68*** 0.44*** 0.32*
(0.06) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.07) (0.11) (0.14)
Adj. R2 0.2892 0.2400 0.2905 0.4434 0.1236 0.1858 0.5214 0.2601 0.1880
N 980 260 230 270 220 196 302 300 182
Note: The full sample includes all three-person observations for which the two matched workers had comparative advantages
in different exams, hence risk-neutral managers could maximize their expected payoffs by assigning the GRE to the deserving
worker. Columns 2-5 report the regression results by the sex composition of the two matched workers. FF represents the groups
with two female workers, MM two males, FM represents the groups where a deserving female has a male partner, and MF
those where a deserving male has a female partner. Variable AAS was omitted from the regression for the sample of deserving
females with male partners (FM) because it has the value zero for all observations. Columns 6-9 report the regression results
by the type of the manager. (* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.)
greater role in task allocations. Managers deviate from efficient allocation mostly when the
money-maximizing strategies would deny one or both workers their desired tasks.
2.4.3 Earnings
The participants earn between $12 and $39.2, which include the earnings from the experiment
and, for the participants in the last five sessions, the payment for the risk-attitude assessment
task. As shown in Figure 2.5, earnings are more dispersed in stage three than in stage one,
reflecting the increase in earnings inequality when individuals specialize in the tasks for which
they have comparative advantages. In both stages one and three, men who prefer the GRE
earn more than women who prefer the GRE, and men who prefer the SAT earn less than
women who prefer the SAT, but none of the gender differences in earnings is statistically
significant. From stage one to stage three, the earnings of both GRE-preferring men and
women improve while the earnings of SAT-preferring men and women shrink. As can be
seen in Table 2.7, the changes in earnings from stage one to stage three are statistically
significant for all types except for the women who prefer the SAT. A gender earnings gap
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did not arise in our experiment due to aspects of our experimental design. For example, in
our experiment, no worker is persistently met with another worker who has a higher ability,
prefers the GRE questions, or of the opposite sex. Subjects who prefer the GRE questions
to the SAT questions earn significantly more than those who prefer the SAT questions to
the GRE questions. Considering the gender difference in task preferences and its influence
on managerial decisions, we suspect that a gender earnings gap may arise if the sample is
not as gender-balanced as ours, but neither our current experimental design nor the number
of observations from 106 subjects can allow a powerful test of the speculation.
Figure 2.5: Compare Earnings Across Stage, by Subject Type
Table 2.7: Mean Earnings Comparison, by Subject Type
Stage FG MG FG−MG FS MS FS −MS
Stage 1 42.14 45.67 -3.52 38.34 37.45 0.89
Stage 3 46.76 49.61 -2.84 37.06 30.85 6.21
Stage 1− 3 -4.62* -3.94* -0.7 1.28 6.60** -5.32
2.5 Conclusion
We examine, in a controlled laboratory experiment, whether men receive lucrative tasks
more often than equally capable women, leading to a gender pay gap in the opportunity
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to earn. Our subjects allocate a standard task and a lucrative task between two workers,
knowing their past performances, task preferences, and sexes. We find that men receive the
lucrative task more often than women, but the difference can largely be explained by past
performance as well as a gender difference in task preference. Half of our subjects shy away
from the lucrative tasks, suggesting that they may incur a psychic cost when working on
tasks that are challenging. More women than men prefer the standard to the lucrative tasks.
The gender difference in task preference is significant, but it does not cause a gender gap in
earnings to arise due to aspects of our experimental design. Task preferences have significant
effects on managerial decisions. Managers choose the efficient task allocation less often when
the workers’ preferences go against rather than with their money-incentive. Overall, the
evidence points to a concern of the managers for the subjective utilities of the workers.
Our research echoes the message of [11] that performance does trump biases, especially
when the workers are evaluated side-by-side, and agrees with [21], which highlights the need
to study the interaction between the demand and supply sides to better understand the
gender wage gap phenomenon. We find it encouraging that the majority of task allocations
are efficient when performance can be accurately measured and evaluated jointly. Employers
and managers may mitigate or overcome potential prejudices or biases by adopting well-
designed performance evaluation practices. Additionally, our results strongly suggest that
the presence of non-performance related information has non-trivial effects on managerial
decisions. While [21] informs us that managers may respond to the same choice (choosing
piece-rates) of male and female workers differently, our study suggests that, when men and
women differ in their preferences in task characteristics, a gender difference in labor market
outcomes may arise even when managers suffer no gender bias.
Our results also draw attention to the importance of distinguishing between monetary
outcomes and subjective welfare when discussing the gender gap in labor market outcomes.12
In light of voluminous experimental evidence on gender differences in their preferences
regarding task characteristics, the decisions that fail to maximize monetary payoffs might,
in fact, be utility-maximizing. Conditional on preferences, a gender earnings gap might be
more begin than we usually consider. However, questions remain regarding the formation
12[37] documents the paradox of declining female happiness.
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of preferences. It is hard to argue whether certain preferences are better than others. The
gender wage gap may truly represent the gender welfare gap only when the factors shaped
our norms and perceptions of gender roles catch up with the converging monetary measures.
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A Appendix A
Appendix A
1. Proof of Lemma 1.1
• (1) Given the monetary disagreement point (a1, a2), consider the allocation z =
(1
2
(1 + a1 − a2), 12(1 − a1 + a2)). Note that z1 + z2 = 1 and z1, z2 > 0 because
ai−aj > −1. Therefore z ∈ A. It remains to show that Ui(z) > Ui(a) for i = 1, 2.
Assume, without loss of generality, that a1 ≤ a2. Then z1 < z2 by construction.
We have
U1(z) = z1 − α1(z2 − z1) = 1
2
(1 + a1 − a2)− α1(a2 − a1)
and
U1(a) = a1 − α1(a2 − a1).
Therefore,
U1(z)− U1(a) = 1
2
(1 + a1 − a2)− a1 = 1
2
(1− a1 − a2) > 0.
Similarly,
U2(z)− U2(a) = 1
2
(1− a1 − a2) > 0.
Therefore (U1(z), U2(z)) ∈ S¯.
• (2) The set S¯ is a quadrilateral (refer to Figure A2). Two of the sides are vertical
and horizontal segments extending from the disagreement point d. If β1 6= 12 , then
S¯ can be described by the equation:
0 ≤ s2 ≤

1+α1−β2
1+2α1
− 1−2β2
1+2α1
s1 0 ≤ s1 ≤ 12
if
1+α2−β1
1−2β1 − 1+2α21−2β1 s1 12 < s1 ≤ 1
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The set S¯ fails to be convex if both boundary segments are downward sloping
and the segment corresponding to s1 <
1
2
is steeper than the one corresponding to
s1 >
1
2
. They are both downward sloping if β1, β2 <
1
2
. Writing out the condition
on the slopes, one sees that
1− 2β2
1 + 2α1
≤ 1 ≤ 1 + 2α2
1− 2β1
and so S¯ must be convex.
2. Proof of Proposition 1.2
Let fN(d, S¯) and fKS(d, S¯) represent the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution to bargaining problems defined in utility payoffs, and fN(a, A¯) and fKS(a, A¯)
represent those to monetary bargaining problems. When βi >
1
2
for i = 1, 2, U1 and
U2 are strictly increasing as the allocation moves toward the even split and they are
maximized at the even split. The objective function (U1−(1−β1)a1)(U2 +α2a1) is also
maximized at the even split because it is strictly increasing in U1 and U2. Therefore,
fN(d, S¯) = (1
2
, 1
2
) when βi >
1
2
for i = 1, 2. When βi >
1
2
for i = 1, 2, (1
2
, 1
2
) is the bliss
point and the maximal point on L(d, b(S¯)). Therefore, fKS(d, S¯) = (1
2
, 1
2
). At the equal
split, the agents do not suffer from disutility, hence fN(a, A¯) = fKS(a, A¯) = (1
2
, 1
2
).
3. Proof of Proposition 1.3
The Nash solution selects a point in the bargaining set that maximizes the product of
the utility increases from the disagreement point:
fN(d, S¯) = arg max
U1,U2
(U1 − d1)(U2 − d2).
For a monetary bargaining problem with disagreement point a = (a1, 0), the
disagreement point is d = ((1 − β1)a1,−α2a1). The Nash solution is found at where
the isoquant (U1 − (1 − β1)a1)(U2 + α2a1) = C (C is a constant) is tangent to the
bargaining frontier.
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We first solve the bargaining problem 〈d, S¯〉 using the Nash solution. The slope of the
isoquant (U1 − (1− β1)a1)(U2 + α2a1) = C is given by
dU2
dU1
= − U2 + α2a1
U1 − (1− β1)a1 . (6)
When evaluated at point (1
2
, 1
2
), it becomes
dU2
dU1
∣∣∣∣
( 1
2
, 1
2
)
= − 1 + 2α2a1
1− 2(1− β1)a1 . (7)
When both β1 and β2 are smaller than
1
2
, as shown in Figure 1.2(a), both segments of
the bargaining frontier are downward sloping. The tangency would happen at a point
on the segment of the bargaining frontier above the 45◦ line if the slope of the isoquant
at (1
2
, 1
2
) is flatter than the slope of the segment of the bargaining frontier above the
45◦ line. i.e.
dU2
dU1
∣∣∣∣
( 1
2
, 1
2
)
= − 1 + 2α2a1
1− 2(1− β1)a1 > −
1− 2β2
1 + 2α1
(8)
The tangency would happen at a point on the segment of the bargaining frontier below
the 45◦ line if the slope of the isoquant at (1
2
, 1
2
) is steeper than the slope of the segment
of the bargaining frontier below the 45◦ line. i.e.
dU2
dU1
∣∣∣∣
( 1
2
, 1
2
)
= − 1 + 2α2a1
1− 2(1− β1)a1 < −
1 + 2α2
1− 2β1 (9)
Otherwise the Nash solution is (1
2
, 1
2
).
First note that inequality (8) never hold for the parameter values in the range restricted
by our assumptions. Solving inequality (9), we obtain the range of parameter values
for which the Nash solution yields an allocation where agent 1 gets higher utility level
than agent 2 does. The condition is given by
a1 >
α2 + β1
α2(1− 2β1) + (1 + 2α2)(1− β1) ≡ a¯1, (10)
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where a¯1 is the lower bound of values of a1 for which the Nash solution assigns more
utility to agent 1 than to agent 2. For a1 ≤ a¯1, the Nash solution remains at the even
split (1
2
, 1
2
).
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is found at the intersection of the bargaining frontier and
the line connecting the disagreement point and the bliss point, L(d, S¯). For a given
disagreement point d = (d1, d2) and a given bliss point b = (b1, b2), L(d, S¯) can be
written as
U1 − d1
b1 − d1 =
U2 − d2
b2 − d2 (11)
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is (1
2
, 1
2
) when L(d, S¯) happens to go through that point,
meaning that equation (11) holds when U1 = U2 =
1
2
. Therefore, Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution is an even split when (1−2d1)/(b1−d1) = (1−2d2)/(b2−d2). We need d1 < 12
to make sure that the even split is Pareto dominating d to begin with.
4. Proof of Proposition 1.4
To show that ∂xN1 /∂β2 = 0, ∂x
N
1 /∂α1 = 0, ∂x
N
1 /∂α2 < 0 and ∂x
N
1 /∂β1 < 0 when
a1 > a¯1 (i.e. when condition (10) holds), first recall that the Nash solution is found
at a point on the segment of the bargaining frontier that is below the 45◦ line in this
case. We obtain the Nash solution by solving equation (34) and the following equation
(the tangency condition) together for UN1 and U
N
2 .
− U2 + α2a1
U1 − (1− β1)a1 = −
1 + 2α2
1− 2β1
⇒ (1 + 2α2)U1 − (1− 2β1)U2 = a1[α2(1− 2β1) + (1− β1)(1 + 2α2)] (12)
Solving the system(1 + 2α2) (1− 2β1)
(1 + 2α2) −(1− 2β1)
×
 UN1
UN2
 =
 1 + α2 − β1
c

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where c = a1[α2(1 − 2β1) + (1 − β1)(1 + 2α2)], we get that the Nash solution when
β1, β2 <
1
2
and a1 > a¯1 is given by
UN1 =
1
2(1 + 2α2)
[(1 + α2 − β1) + c], (13)
and
UN2 =
1
2(1− 2β1) [(1 + α2 − β1)− c]. (14)
Note that UN1 > U
N
2 because the tangency happens at the segment of the bargaining
frontier below the 45◦ line. Using equations (29) and (30), we can transform the Nash
solutions (13) and (14) back into monetary terms, which are given by
xN1 =
1 + α2
2(1 + 2α2)
− β1
2(1− 2β1) +
c
2(1 + 2α2)(1− 2β1) , (15)
and
xN2 =
α2
2(1 + 2α2)
+
1− β1
2(1− 2β1) −
c
2(1 + 2α2)(1− 2β1) . (16)
It is easy to see that ∂xN1 /∂β2 = 0, ∂x
N
1 /∂α1 = 0 because x1 is not a function of β2
or α1. Taking the partial derivatives of x
N
1 as given by equation 13 with respect to α2
and β1, we have that
∂xN1
∂α2
= − (1− a1)
2(1 + 2α2)2
< 0,
and
∂xN1
∂β1
= − (1− a1)
2(1− 2β1)2 < 0.
To show that ∂xKS1 /∂β2 ≥ 0, ∂xKS1 /∂α1 ≥ 0, ∂xKS1 /∂β1 < 0, and that ∂xKS1 /∂α2 < 0
when a1 = 0, but the sign of ∂x
KS
1 /∂α2 is ambiguous when a1 > 0, we need to show
how points d and b(S¯), and line L(d, S¯) move as a result of changes in the preference
parameters.
First, we study the movement of d when α1, β1, β2 changes. Recall that
d = (d1, d2) = ((1− β1)a1,−α2a1).
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Taking the derivative of d1 and the derivative of d2 with respect to α1, β1, and β2, we
have that
∂d1
∂α1
= 0 and
∂d2
∂α1
= 0 (17)
∂d1
∂β1
= −a1 < 0 and ∂d2
∂β1
= 0 (18)
∂d1
∂β2
= 0 and
∂d2
∂β2
= 0 (19)
Second, we study the movement of b(S¯). When β1, β2 <
1
2
and d1 <
1
2
, the bliss point
b(S¯) is given by
(b1, b2) =
(
(1 + α2 − β1) + α2(1− 2β1)a1
(1 + 2α2)
,
(1 + α1 − β2)− (1− β1)(1− 2β2)a1
(1 + 2α1)
)
When β1, β2 <
1
2
and d1 >
1
2
, the bliss point b′(S¯) is given by
(b1, b
′
2) =
(
(1 + α2 − β1) + α2(1− 2β1)a1
(1 + 2α2)
,
(1 + α2 − β1)− (1 + 2α2)(1− β1)a1
(1− 2β1)
)
The derivatives of b1, b2 and b
′
2 with respect to the preference parameters are given by
∂b1
∂α1
= 0
∂b2
∂α1
= −(1− 2β2)(1− (1− β1)a1)
(1 + 2α1)2
< 0 and
∂b′2
∂α1
= 0 (20)
∂b1
∂β1
= −1 + 2α2a1
1 + 2α2
< 0
∂b2
∂β1
=
(1− 2β2)a1
1 + 2α1
> 0
and
∂b′2
∂β1
=
(1 + 2α2)(1− (1− β1)a1)
(1− 2β1)2 > 0 (21)
∂b1
∂β2
= 0
∂b2
∂β2
= −(1− 2(1− β1)a1)
1 + 2α1
< 0 and
∂b′2
∂β2
= 0 (22)
From (17) and (20) or (19) and (22), we know that d does not move, b(S¯) moves
downward, and b′(S¯) does not move when α1 or β2 increases. A downward movement
of b(S¯) means that L(d, b(S¯)) intersects the bargaining frontier at a lower point, leading
to an increase in U1 and a decrease in U2, which also implies an increase in x1 and a
decrease in x2 when x1 + x2 = 1.
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From (18) and (21), we know that d moves to the left, both b(S¯) and b′(S¯) move to the
left and upward when α1 increases. This means that both L(d, b(S¯)) and L(d, b
′(S¯))
intersect the bargaining frontier at a higher point, leading to an increase in U2 and a
decrease in U1, implying an increase in x2 and a decrease in x1.
Therefore, ∂xKS1 /∂α1 ≥ 0, ∂xKS1 /∂β1 < 0, and ∂xKS1 /∂β2 ≥ 0.
Now we show that ∂xKS1 /∂α2 < 0 when a1 = 0. The disagreement point is d = (0, 0).
The bliss point in this case is given by
(b1, b2) =
(
1 + α2 − β1
1 + 2α2
,
1 + α1 − β2
1 + 2α1
)
The slope of L(d, S¯) is given by
(1 + 2α2)(1 + α1 − β2)
(1 + 2α1)(1 + 2α1)
(23)
Take the derivative of the above slope with respect to α2 we have that
2(1 + α1 − β2)
(1 + 2α1)(1 + 2α1)
> 0,
which implies that L(d, S¯) becomes steeper when α2 increases. This change allows
L(d, S¯) to intersect the bargaining frontier at a higher point, increasing U2 and
decreasing U1. x1 decreases as a result.
Lastly, we show that the sign of ∂xKS1 /∂α2 is ambiguous when a1 > 0. When a1 > 0,
∂d1
∂α2
= 0 and
∂d2
∂α2
= −a1 < 0 (24)
∂b1
∂α2
= −(1− 2β1)(1− a1)
(1 + 2α2)2
< 0
∂b2
∂α2
= 0
and
∂b′2
∂α2
=
1− 2(1− β1)a1
1− 2β1 (its sign is ambiguous) (25)
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From 24 and 25, we know that L(d, b(S¯)) and L(d, b′(S¯)) rotates in a manner that
may allow them to intersect the bargaining frontier at a lower or higher point. We
cannot unambiguously sign the derivative ∂xKS1 /∂α2 when a1 > 0. Here we provide
two numerical examples, the first shows that increasing α2 increases U1, which implies
an increase in x1; the second example shows the opposite.
Example 1:
a1 = 0.1, β1 = β2 = 0.1, α1 = 1, α2 = 1.2 ⇒ UKS1 ≈ 0.512.
a1 = 0.1, β1 = β2 = 0.1, α1 = 1, α2 = 10 ⇒ UKS1 ≈ 0.509.
In this example, agent 1 gets less when agent 2 becomes more averse to disadvantageous
inequality.
Example 2:
a1 = 0.3, β1 = β2 = 0.1, α1 = 1, α2 = 1.2 ⇒ UKS1 ≈ 0.526.
a1 = 0.3, β1 = β2 = 0.1, α1 = 1, α2 = 10 ⇒ UKS1 ≈ 0.529.
In this example, agent 1 gets more when agent 2 becomes more averse to disadvanta-
geous inequality.
49
Appendix B
Transformation of the bargaining set:
The feasible set defined in monetary payoffs, A, is the subset of the x1 × x2 plane shown
in the left panel of Figure A1 that is enclosed by lines
x1 = 0, (26)
x2 = 0, (27)
and
x1 + x2 = 1. (28)
We transform set A and represent it on the U1×U2 plane using Fehr-Schmidt preferences.
When the agents are inequity averse, their utility functions are given by U1 = x1 and U2 = x2
when x1 = x2. When x1 > x2, they are given by
U1 = x1 − β1(x1 − x2) = (1− β1)x1 + β1x2, (29)
and
U2 = x2 − α2(x1 − x2) = (1 + α2)x2 − α2x1. (30)
When x1 < x2, they are given by
U1 = x1 − α1(x2 − x1) = (1 + α1)x1 − α1x2, (31)
and
U2 = x2 − β2(x2 − x1) = (1− β2)x2 + β2x1. (32)
Taking the difference of Ui and U3−i where i = 1, 2, we notice that Ui − U3−i = (1 + α3−i −
βi)(xi − x3−i) > 0 whenever xi > x3−i, which means that whichever agent has the higher
monetary payoff should also have the higher Fehr-Schmidt utility level.
Figure A1 shows the transformation of the feasible monetary bargaining set A to its
counterpart S in utility space. To transform the segment of the monetary bargaining frontier
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Figure A1: Transformation of the Feasible Set
above the 45◦ line to its counterpart in utility space, we solve equations (28), (31), and (32)
jointly to write U2 as a function of U1:
U2 = −1− 2β2
1 + 2α1
U1 +
1 + α1 − β2
1 + 2α1
. (33)
To transform the segment of the monetary bargaining frontier below the 45◦ line, we solve
equations (28), (29), and (30) jointly to write U2 as a function of U1:
U2 = −1 + 2α2
1− 2β1U1 +
1 + α2 − β1
1− 2β1 . (34)
To transform the vertical boundary of set A, we solve equations (26), (31), and (32)
jointly to write U2 as a function of U1:
U2 = −1− β2
α1
U1. (35)
To transform the horizontal boundary of set A, we solve equations (27), (29), and (30) jointly
to write U2 as a function of U1:
U2 = − α2
1− β1U1. (36)
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The feasible set defined in utility space, S, is the subset of the U1×U2 plane that is enclosed
by lines (33), (34), (35), and (36).
Figure A2 shows the transformation from bargaining set A¯ to S¯. The boundaries of A¯
are traced out by segments of the agents’ indifference curves going through the monetary
disagreement point a = (a1, 0). Sets A¯ and S¯ differ from sets A and S by excluding allocations
that are individually irrational for inequity averse agents to choose. At a = (a1, 0), the utility
(0, 1)
(1, 0)(0, 0)
(12 ,
1
2)
(a1, 0)
(−α1, 1− β2)
(1− β1,−α2)
(0, 0)
(12 ,
1
2)
((1− β1)a1,−α2a1)
a
d
A¯ S¯
x2
x1
U2
U1
p1
p2
p3
U(p2)
U(p1)
U(p3)
Figure A2: Transformation of the Bargaining Set from A¯ to S¯
of agent 1 is given by
U1
∣∣∣∣
(a1,0)
= (1− β1)a1. (37)
To get the indifference curve of agent 1 that goes through point a, we solve
(1− β1)x1 + β1x2 = (1− β1)a1,
and
(1 + α1)x1 − α1x2 = (1− β1)a1.
At the 45◦ line, the indifference curve of agent 1 is x1 = x2. Its segment below the 45◦ line
is given by
x2 = −1− β1
β1
x1 +
1− β1
β1
a1, (38)
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and its segment above the 45◦ line is given by
x2 =
1 + α1
α1
x1 − 1− β1
α1
a1. (39)
Following similar steps, we can obtain the indifference curve of agent 2. At the monetary
disagreement point a, the utility of agent 2 is given by
U2
∣∣∣∣
(a1,0)
= −α2a1 (40)
At the 45◦ line, the indifference curve of agent 2 is x1 = x2. Its segment below the 45◦ line
is given by
x2 =
α2
1 + α2
x1 − α2
1 + α2
a1, (41)
and its segment above the 45◦ line is given by
x2 = − β2
1− β2x1 −
α2
1− β2a1. (42)
The bargaining set A¯ is the subset of the x1× x2 plane enclosed by lines (28), (38), (39),
and (41). The counterpart of A¯ in utility space, S¯, is the subset of the U1×U2 plane enclosed
by lines (33), (34), (37), and (40). Alternatively, A¯ is the convex hull of points a, p1, p2, and
p3, and S¯ is the convex hull of points d, U(p1), U(p2), and U(p3), where
a = (a1, 0),
p1 = (
α1
1+2α1
+ 1−β1
1+2α1
a1,
1+α1
1+2α1
− 1−β1
1+2α1
a1),
p2 = ((1− β1)a1, (1− β1)a1),
p3 = (
1+α2
1+2α2
+ α2
1+2α2
a1,
α2
1+2α2
− α2
1+2α2
a1),
and
d = (a1(1− β1),−a1α2),
U(p1) = ((1− β1)a1, (1+α1−β2)−(1−β1)(1−2β2)a11+2α1 ),
U(p2) = ((1− β1)a1, (1− β1)a1),
U(p3) = (
(1+α2−β1)−α2(1−2β1)a1
1+2α2
,−α2a1).
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B Appendix B
Figure B1: Success Rates in Stage One, by Sex
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Figure B2: Cost of Choosing the Inefficient Task Allocation as a Percentage of the Expected
Payoff from Choosing the Efficient Task Allocation
Figure B3: No Explicit Label of the Question Type
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Figure B4: Indicating Task Preference
Figure B5: Task Allocation Decision
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Experiment Instructions
We invite you to participate in a research of economic decision-making. We ask you
to read these instructions and to ask questions that you may have before we start the
experiment.
Experiment Overview
In this experiment, you will be asked a series of verbal analogy questions that have
appeared in past versions of an undergraduate entrance exam (SAT) and a graduate school
entrance exam (GRE). The bulk of your earnings will depend on your ability to answer these
questions correctly. You will also be asked to assign questions to some other participants
currently in the lab, and the remaining part of your earnings will depend on whether or not
they correctly answer the questions assigned by you.
The experiment consists of two questionnaires and three stages of play (see Experiment
Timeline). You will fill out a questionnaire before Stage 1 and after Stage 3 of the experiment.
In Stage 1, you will have 15 minutes to answer 20 verbal analogy questions taken from
past versions of SAT and GRE exams. 10 of these questions will be SAT questions, and
10 of them will be GRE questions. However, the questions will be presented to you in a
random order and in the same format. So, you will not be able to tell the two apart. Your
answer choices will be saved automatically by the computer. After you have completed all
20 questions, you can review and change your answers until you reach the time limit of the
stage. After all participants have submitted their answers (or when the timer expires), you
will learn about your success rates and the number of tokens earned on both tests. Then,
you will indicate which type of questions, SAT or GRE, you would like to answer in Stage 3
of the experiment.
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In Stage 2, each participant will make 10 rounds of question-assignment decisions. In
each round, you will allocate an SAT question and a GRE question between two other players
currently in the lab. You will receive information about their preferred question-type and
their Stage 1 success rates, and you will assign an SAT question to one of them and a GRE
question to the other. You will not know the specifics of any question you assign. You are
simply determining the type of question assigned to each player.
Once everyone has made their decision, assignments will be recorded in our computer
system and a new round of question-assignment will begin. Each round of question-
assignment will follow the same structure described above. The only thing that will change
from round to round is the pair of players you will assign questions to. By the end of the
stage, you will have assigned 10 SAT questions and 10 GRE questions to different players
currently in the lab.
In Stage 3, all players will receive 20 questions to complete as a result of Stage 2. The
number of SAT and/or GRE questions you are given will depend only on the assignment
decisions of your fellow players. You will have 15 minutes to answer all 20 questions. Like
in Stage 1, the questions will be presented in the same format, and your answer choices will
be saved automatically by the computer. Once you have submitted your responses, you will
learn about your own success rates, the success rates of the players you allocated questions
to, and your total earnings from this experiment.
You can use the handout titled “Experiment Timeline” to keep track of the progress of
the experiment.
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Experiment Timeline
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Earnings Determination
Each correctly answered SAT question is worth 2 tokens. Each correctly answered GRE
question is worth 5 tokens.
Your total number of tokens earned in the experiment will be the sum of the tokens
earned in the three stages of the experiment. Your earnings in tokens will be converted to
dollars at the rate 5 tokens = $1.
Your earnings in Stage 1 and 3 will be the total number of tokens you earned for correctly
answering the verbal analogy questions. You will earn nothing if you answer a question
incorrectly.
• For example, if you correctly answer four SAT questions and three GRE questions in
Stage 1, you would earn a total of 23 tokens (calculated as 2* four + 5*three = 23).
Your earnings in Stage 2 will depend on the Stage 3 performance of the players you
allocated questions to. You will earn 2 tokens if a player correctly answers an SAT question
assigned by you and 5 tokens if a player correctly answers a GRE question assigned by you.
You will earn nothing if the player answers the question incorrectly.
• For example, if six of the ten players you assigned an SAT question in Stage 2 answer
the question correctly in Stage 3, you will receive 12 tokens (2*six=12) from the SAT
questions you assigned. If six of the ten players you assigned a GRE question in Stage
2 answer the question correctly in Stage 3, you will receive 30 tokens (5*six=30) from
the GRE questions you assigned.
In general, you will earn more tokens if you answer more questions correctly and/or if the
players you assigned questions to answer more questions correctly.
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Payment Method
All payments will be done by a third party to ensure that all participants’ earnings are
known neither by any other participant nor by the experimenter. A third party in a separate
room will arrive with envelopes and distribute them by station letter. Before you leave, make
sure you have received the proper amount and signed the receipt. You will hand in your
receipt and envelope as you exit the lab. (These final instructions will be read again at the
conclusion of the experiment.)
Now, before we begin ...
In case any of you are not familiar with the SAT or GRE exams, let’s review an example
of verbal analogy questions before we start the experiment:
Question Answer Choices
A.) nap : fatigue
B.) light : dark
ASPRIN : HEADACHE :: C.) rubber : mat
D.) teammate : friendship
E.) clash : titan
Correct Answer: A.)
The analogy, “ASPRIN : HEADACHE :: nap : fatigue,” should be read “aspirin is to
headache as nap is to fatigue.” Analogy questions ask you to select the pair of words among
the answer choices that most closely reflects the relationship between the pair of words in
capital letters.
Now, you can open and run the Z-leaf application. A computer program will guide you
through each stage of the experiment. Please follow the instructions that will appear on the
screen closely and make sure that you complete the decisions within the time limit of each
stage. You will be able to see the remaining time (in seconds) at the upper-right corner of
the screen.
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Gamble Selection
You will select one from the six gambles listed below to play.
Each gamble has two possible outcomes (LOW or HIGH). Each outcome has a 50% chance
of occurring. Your earnings from playing the gamble will be determined by
• Which one of the six gambles you select; and
• Which one of the two possible outcomes occurs.
For example, if you select Gamble 4, you will receive
• 8 tokens if the LOW outcome occurs; and
• 44 tokens if the HIGH outcome occurs.
You must select one and only one gamble.
You will be asked to enter your gamble choice during the first questionnaire. The outcome
(LOW or HIGH) of the gamble will be determined by a computerized coin-flip in the
background program. The outcome and the associated payoff will be revealed to you by
the end of the second questionnaire. You will learn which outcome had occurred. Your
payoff from playing the gamble will be converted to dollars (5 tokens = $1) and added to
your earnings from the experiment.
List of Gambles
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